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EVIDENCE-SAFEGUARDING ADMISSIBILITY OF HYPNOTICALLY
ENHANCED TESTIMONY-S'tate v.

Hurd, 86

N.J.

525, 432 A.2d 86

(1981).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Hurd I involved the admissibility of hypnotically en
hanced testimony of the victim of an assault in an attempt to refresh
her recollection of the crime. 2 At approximately 5:45 a.m. on the
morning of June 22, 1978, Jane Sell was attacked and stabbed while
asleep in her apartment bedroom. 3 Mrs. Sell survived the many
knife wounds but was unable4 to describe her assailant after the at
tack. s Subsequently, she agreed to undergo hypnosis by a psychia
trist6 to enhance her recollection of the incident. 7
Less than two weeks after the incident.. Mrs. Sell.. accomoanied
by her present husband and two officers from the prosecutor's office
went to visit Dr. Herbert Spiegel, a noted hypnotist. s Once induced
into a hypnotic state, Mrs. Sell relived the attack. 9 At one point
during the session, she was asked if her assailant was her former
husband,1O and she responded affirmatively. I I When she was
State v.

~

L 86 N.J. 525,432 A.2d 86 (1981).
2. Id. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88.
3. The evidence shows that the assailant did not intend to rob Mrs. Sell or commit
a sexual act upon her. /d. at 529, 432 A.2d at 88.
4. When an individual experiences a sequence of events which are extremely emo
tional, recall of those events is frequently hazy, thus explaining Mrs. Sell's lack of recall.
See DePiano & Salzberg, Hypnosis as an Aid 10 Recall of Meaningful Information
Presented under Three Types of Arousal, 29 INT'L J. OF CLiN. & EXPER. HYPNOSIS 383,
383 (1981).
5. 86 N.J. at 530,432 A.2d at 88. While in the hospital emergency room, Mrs. Sell
asked the police to "check out" her former husband but she did not identify the defend
ant as the attacker at that point in time. Id.
6. The prosecutor's office suggested that Mrs. Sell visit a psychiatrist. Id.
7. Id. It is essential that the subject be motivated and willing to contribute mean
ingfully to the investigation of the crime in order for hypnosis to be helpful in jogging the
subject's memory. Schafer & Rubio, Hypnosis to Aid the Recall of Witnesses, 26 INT'L J.
OF CLiN. & EXPER. HYPNOSIS, 81, 83 (1978).
8. 86 N.J. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88.
9. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89. Before inducing Mrs. Sell into hypnosis, Dr. Spiegel
questioned Mrs. Sell on her memory of the event. During this interview, and the subse
quent hypnotic session, a tape recorder was used to record the session. Id., 432 A.2d at
88.
10. Mrs. Sell was previously married to the defendant. After her divorce, she re
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brought out of the trance, she expressed doubt about her recollec
tion; nevertheless, she was encouraged by Dr. Spiegel and Detective
Pierangeli to make a positive identification, which she did six days
later. 12 On the basis of this identification, Mrs. Sell's former hus
band was indicted. 13
The trial court suppressed the identification in Slale v. Hurd,14
concluding that the hypnotist and law enforcement officials had ex
erted pressure on Mrs. Sell and induced her into identifying the de
fendanLls The court declined, however, to hold that hypnotically
enhanced testimonyl6 was inadmissible per se .17 Rather, it imposed
upon the state the burden of establishing the reliability of hypnoti
cally enhanced testimony by clear and convincing evidence. IS The
trial court then adopted six procedural safeguards that were pro
posed by Dr. Martin T. Ome,19 an expert witness for the defense
who specifically designed the safeguards to guarantee reliability.20
married and lived with her present husband and her three sons, two of whom are chil
dren from her previous marriage to the defendant. Id at 530, 432 A.2d at 88. At the
time of the assault, she had been divorced from the defendant for seven years although
they continued to disagree over visitation rights and the disposition of jointly owned
property. Id
II. Id at 531, 432 A.2d at 89. Detective Marilyn Pierangeli asked Mrs. Sell if the
assailant was someone she knew. Mrs. Sell answered "Yes." When asked if it was her
present husband, she responded "No." When asked if her first husband assaulted her,
she responded affirmatively with emotion. ld
12. Id at 531-32, 432 A.2d at 89.
13. Id at 532, 432 A.2d at 89. The defendant was "charged with assault with in
tent to kill, atrocious assault and battery, assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a
dangerous knife, and breaking and entry with intent to assault." Id
14. 173 N.l. Super. 333, 369, 414 A.2d 291, 309 (Law Div. 1980), affd, 86 N.l. 525,
432 A.2d 86 (1981).
15. ld.
16. For purposes of this article, the terms refreshed, enhanced, induced and influ
enced will be used interchangeably when discussing testimony which was the product of
hypnosis.
17. 173 N.l. Super. at 369, 414 A.2d at 309. The trial court found that the potential
for fanl..lsy and confabulation during a hypnotic session dictates that hypnotically re
freshed evidence should not be given automatic admissibility. ld at 362, 414 A.2d at
305.
18. Id at 364, 414 A.2d at 306-07.
19. Dr. Orne, Director of the Unit for Experimental Psychiatry at Pennsylvania
Hospital, and an expert in the field of hypnosis, has been a frequent critic of the use of
hypnosis in the legal process. For a current analysis of Dr. Orne's viewpoint, see gener
ally Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 3 CRIME & lUST. 61 (1980).
20. 173 N.l. Super. at 363, 414 A.2d at 306. The safeguards are:
(I) The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed psychiatrist or
psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis.
(2) The qualified professional conducting the hypnotic session should be in
dependent of and not responsible to the prosecutor, investigator or the defense.
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed and adopted the six
safeguards articulated by the trial court. 21 This article will initially
summarize the controversy surrounding the admissibility of hypnoti
cally enhanced testimony, bring forth the cases and leading articles
which led up to and culminated in the Hurd decision, and analyze
the viability of the Hurd safeguards. Finally, the ramifications of
Hurd in future cases will be discussed.
II.

RELIABILITY OF HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY

The use of hypnosis as an investigatory tool arises because in a
traumatic situation, an individual may focus on certain aspects of the
event while giving little attention to peripheral aspects. 22 Often,
these peripheral aspects cannot be recalled without the use of hypno
sis, even though they were recorded by the mind. 23 In the last dec
ade, hypnosis has been used in law enforcement to allow victims and
witnesses the opportunity to enhance their memories concerning
events that have subsequentiy resulted in criminal prosecution. 24
Critics of the use of hypnosis argue that the practice results in a
(3) Any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel
prior to the hypnotic session must be in written form so that subsequently the
extent of the information the subject received from the hypnotist may be
determined.
(4) Before introduction of hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain from the sub
ject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them, carefully
avoiding adding any new elements to the witness' description of the events.
(5) All contacts between the hypnotist and the subject should be recorded so
that a permanent record is available for comparison and study to establish that
the witness has not recieved information or suggestion which might later be
reported as having been first described by the subject during hypnosis. Video
tape should be employed if possible, but should not be mandatory.
(6) Only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase of
the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and post-hypnotic
interview.
Id
If these procedures are followed, the court must still be "satisfied that there was no
impermissibly suggestive or coercive conduct by the hypnotist and law enforcement per
sonnel connected with the hypnotic exercise. . . ." Id at 364, 414 A.2d at 306.
21. 86 N.J. at 545, 549, 432 A.2d at 96, 99.
22. Zelig & Beidleman, The Investigative Use 0/ Hypnosis: A Word 0/ Caution, 39
INT'L J. OF CLiN. & EXPER. HYPNOSIS, 401, 402 (1981) (citing Stratton, The Use of Hyp
nosis in Law En/orcement Crimina/Investigations: A Pilot Program, 5 J. POLICE SCI. AD.
399,400 (1977) where it was concluded that by relaxing and focusing on other aspects of
the criminal events, the hypnotic subject has greater recall of peripheral events and
incidents).
23. Zelig & Beidleman, supra note 22, at 402.
24. Monrose, Justice With Glazed Eyes: The Growing Use of Hypnotism in Law
En/orcement, JURIS DR., Oct.-Nov. 1978, at 54.
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state of altered consciousness and heightened suggestibility whereby
a subject experiences distortions of reality, false memories, fantasies,
and confabulation. 25 Critics claim that the. foremost problem in us
ing hypnosis is that the hypnotist unintentionally causes the subject
to conform to the hypnotist's point ofview. 26 Other potential pitfalls
include the subject's ability to lie even while in a deep hypnotic
trance,27 and the risk that the subject may unintentionally respond to
implicit stimuli that emanate unknowingly from the hypnotist and
are unrecognized by the subject. 28 The desire to please the hypnotist
often induces the subject to mirror the attitude that he senses from
the hypnotist's questions and behavior. 29 One team of experts be
lieves that the very wording of questions may distort the witness'
memory.30 Still other critics of forensic hypnosis charge that it re
sembles totalitarian mind manipulation and that amateur hypnotists
may conjure up "memories" that, in reality, are more fantasy than
fact. 3I
Despite such criticism, however, several experts believe that
hypnosis may be valuable to law enforcement officials when profes
sionals administer the procedure. 32 It is believed that hypnosis may
help an eyewitness recall an incident more accurately, including im
portant details that would not have otherwise been recalled. 33 Police
detectives and other proponents insist that hypnosis is a safe and
effective tool which is instrumental in saving time in difficult cases.
It has been characterized as a "miraculous divining rod of sortS."34
Those involved in the field of hypnosis, however, have resisted
the training of police officers to administer hypnosis. The Executive
ENCYCLOPEADIA BRITANNICA Hypnosis 133, 139 (15th ed. 1974).
26. See Kroger & Douce, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation, 27 INT'L J. OF CLIN.
& EXPER. HYPNOSIS 358, 366 (1979).
27. Id
28. Id
29. Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence
Susceptible? 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 591 (1977).
30. Hilgard & Loftus, Effective Interrogation ofthe Eyewitness, 27 INT'L J. OF CLIN.
& EXPER. HYPNOSIS 342, 342 (1979). The authors found that leading questions serve
only to distort the witness' memory. Id
3'. Alsop, Clue That Is Buried In the Subconscious May Crack the Case, Wall St.
J., June 27, 1978 at 1, col. 4.
32. See generally Schafer & Rubio, supra note 7.
33. Monrose, supra note 23, at 55; see also Reiser, Hypnosis as an Aid in a Homicide
Investigation, 17 AM. J. OF CLIN. HYPNOSIS 84 (1974), in which it was concluded that
even a witness whose thought pattern was impaired by drugs and alcohol may have his
memory refreshed while under hypnosis assuming the witness is eager to contribute
meaningfully to the investigation. Id at 87.
34. Monrose, supra note 23, at 55.
25.
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Council of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis35
unanimously adopted a resolution forbidding police officers from
hypnotizing prospective witnesses because of potential bias and lack
of expertise. 36
Martin T. Orne, the expert who promulgated the safeguards
that were accepted in Hurd,37 believes that the use of hypnosis is
useful to refresh memories and to facilitate eyewitness identifications
when neither the subject, the authorities, nor the hypnotist have
preconceptions as to who the criminal may be. 38 He warns, however,
that where such preconceptions do exist, hypnosis may "cause the
subject to confabulate the person who is suspected into his 'hypnoti
cally enhanced memories.' "39
In light of such problems, experts have suggested alternatives
ranging from a complete ban of the use of hypnosis as an investiga
tory tool,4O to viewing hypnosis with extreme caution limiting its em
ployment to situations where it is imperative that a key witness have
his memory "unlocked."41
Most experts agree, however, that the use of hypnosis to obtain
35. The Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis is a major professional
association in the field of hypnosis. See Margolin, Hypnosis-Enhanced Testimony: Valid
Evidence or Prosecutor's Tool? 17 TRIAL 42 (Oct. 1981).
36. The resolution, passed in October 1978, contained the following language:
Because we recognize that hypnotically aided recall may produce either accu
rate memories or at times may facilitate the creation of pseudo memories, or
fantasies that are accepted as real by subject and hypnotist alike, we are deeply
troubled by the utilization of this techniques [sic) among the police. It must be
emphasized that there is no known way of distinguishing with certainty be
tween actual recall and pseudo memories except by independent verification
. . . . [P)olice officers usually have strong views as to who is likely to be guilty
of a crime and may easily inadvertently bias the hypnotized subject'S memories
even without themselves being aware of their actions.
27 INT'L J. OF CLiN. & EXPER. HYPNOSIS 452, 452 (1979).
37. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
38. Orne, The Use and Misuse ofHypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. OF CLiN. & EXPER.
HYPNOSIS 311, 311 (1979).
39. Id DePiano and Salzberg found that hypnosis yields positive effects only
under very selected conditions such as: ( I) When meaningful information is recalled;
(2) when the material recalled is linked to a connected series of events; (3) when material
is incidentally, not intentionally learned; and (4) when used on subjects who have been
emotionally aroused during the learning process. DePiano & Salzberg, supra note 4, at
386-87.
40. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective
Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313,349 (1980).
41. Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 OHIO N.U.L.
REv. I, 23 (1977). Dilloff believes that a witness whose memory has been hypnotically
refreshed should be allowed to testify in some circumstances although the cross-examiner
should be given the opportunity to impeach such testimony. Id. at 22.
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leads and clues is the most appropriate area for the science. 42 When
the sole motive for using hypnosis is to provide clues that ultimately
will lead to incriminating evidence, the mere fact that hypnosis was
employed becomes unimportant. 43 The statements given during the
hypnosis are not admissible, only the clues derived therefrom are
helpful. Thus, when information obtained through hypnosis leads to
the investigation of a suspect who can be convicted by additional,
material evidence, the use of hypnosis is appropriate. 44
A.

Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony as Scient!fic Evidence

In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia established the standard for admitting scientific evidence
in Frye v. United States ,45 a standard which is still applicable. 46 The
court found that a scientific principle may produce important evi
dence, but that the principle must first be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptability in its field. 47 Accordingly, several
courts that have been faced with hypnotically enhanced testimony
have had to ascertain whether experts in the field of hypnosis believe
that hypnosis yields reliable results and is a generally accepted scien
tific principle. 48
Around the turn of the century, courts found hypnotically en
hanced evidence to be unreasonable and contrary to all rational ex
perience. 49 Research continued, however, and in 1968, Harding v.
State 50 became the first reported decision allowing the use of hypno
sis to enhance the memory of a witness. Harding did not specifically
42. See Orne, supra note 33, at 327.
43. Id at 328.
44. See Schafer & Rubio, supra note 7, at 90.
45. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
46. The Frye test has been the target of frequent criticism in that general accept
ance should not go to the question of admissibility but only to the weight to be afforded
thereto. See State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 83-84 (Iowa 1980), cerl. denied, 450 U.S. 927
(1981) (citing MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 203 at 491 (E.
Cleary 2d ed. 1972».
Despite such criticism, the Frye test is still the applicable standard in most cases
involving hypnotically refreshed testimony. Hurd, for example, utilizes the Frye stan
dard as its benchmark in deciding whether hypnotically enhanced testimony is admissi
ble and reliable. 86 N.J. at 535-36, 432 A.2d at 91; see also People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d
18,35,641 P.2d 775,783-84, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 252 (1982).
47. 293 F. at 1014.
48. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Austin v. Barker, 110 A.D. 510, 516-18, 96 N.Y.S. 814, 818-19 (1906);
People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 665, 49 P. 1049, 1053 (1897).
50. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302, cerl. denied, 252 Md. 731 (1968), cerl. denied,
395 U.S. 949 (1969).
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refer to the Frye test, but did hold that pretrial hypnotism of a rape
victim affected the credibility rather than the admissibility of the evi
dence. 51 The testimony was found not to be irreparably tainted by
the use of hypnosis52 and a precautionary instruction was given to
the jury.53
Of the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of hypnoti
cally enhanced testimony in the decade following Harding, a major
ity have adopted the standard espoused by that court. 54 In courts
that subsequently admitted hypnotically enhanced testimony, ex
perts were often called to testify, but the courts refused to specifically
apply the Frye test. 55 Seemingly, the courts assumed that the use of
hypnosis was generally accepted and thought to be reliable by ex
perts in the field. 56
By the late 1970's, critics became more numerous and vocal.
Writers were finding that hypnotically enhanced testimony had seri
ous dangers which made it less credible than other testimony be
cause of the inherent difficulty in detecting these dangers. 57
Recently, the highest courts of Minnesota and Arizona have held
that hypnotically enhanced testimony is induced by a procedure
which cannot meet the Frye standard of admissibility.58 In State v.
Mack 59 the Minnesota Supreme.Court found that hypnosis had not
developed to the point where experts in the field widely shared the
51. 5 Md. App. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
52. The court stated that the evidence should be admitted where: (1) The proce
dure used in hypnotizing the victim was fully exposed in the evidence; (2) professional
psychologist induced the hypnosis and he testified that there was no reason to doubt the
truth of the victim's statements; and (3) there was sufficient corroboration of the witness'
testimony. Id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312.
53. Id.
54. See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cerl. denied, 444
U.S. 885 (1979); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v.
Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1974); Connolly v. Farmer, 484
F.2d 456,457 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 282 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 138, 205 S.E.2d 240, 241-42 (1974); People v.
Smrekar, 68 m. App. 3d 379, 386, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1979); People v. Hughes, 99
Misc.2d 863, 869-70, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647-48 (Onondaga County Ct. 1979); State v.
McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119-23,244 S.E.2d 414,427-29 (1978); State v. Brom, 8 Or. App.
598,602,494 P.2d 434, 436 (1972); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1,9,492 P.2d 312, 315
(1971).
55. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. See Dillofi', supra note 38, at 22.
58. State v. Mena, 624 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764
(Minn. 1980).
59. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
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view that the results were scientifically reliable. 60 Thus, the court
held that hypnotically enhanced testimony was per se inadmissible
under the Frye standard. 61
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona in State v. Mena 62
concluded that the risks in using hypnosis and the unknown conse
quences therein were so great that the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an individual should not depend upon its use. 63 While
the court recognized that the use of hypnosis for thereapeutic pur
poses had been approved by the American Medical Association,64 it
definitively rejected the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony,
claiming its use had unknown consequences and created undue dan
gers of distortion, delusion, and fantasy.65 In sum, both the Arizona
and Minnesota courts found that until hypnosis had become a
widely recognized and accepted procedure among experts, such evi
dence ordinarily must be considered inadmissible. 66
While the courts in Arizona and Minnesota represent one view,
Dr. Orne and a majority of experts in the field believe th.at testimony
60. Id at 768.
61. Id at 772. The Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that a hypnotic subject
is highly susceptible to suggestion and that there is no way to determine from the content
of the memory itself which parts are accurate, which are fanciful and which are outright
lies. See id at 769-71.
See also People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cerro
denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982), where the California Supreme Court recently found that
the use of hypnosis to restore the memory of a potential witness is not generally accepted
as reliable by the scientific community thus the Frye test of admissibility was found not
to be satisfied. In its opinion, the court rejected the Hurd safeguards because of the
inherent problems and questions regarding the safeguards and because of the great
problems of suggestability and reliability in hypnotically refreshed testimony. Id at 37
40, 641 P.2d at 785-87, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 254-56.
In a concurring opinion, it was recommended that the approach of Hurd should be
followed. Id at 72-73, 641 P.2d at 808, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 276. (Richardson, J., concur
ring). Moreover, Justice Kaus pointed out that it was unwise to adopt aper se rule at this
point without carefully considering the potential utility of hypnosis in certain instances.
Id at 74,641 P.2d at 809, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 277-78. (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
62. 624 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1981).
63. Id at 1279.
64. See Council on Mental Health, Medical Use of Hypnosis, 168 J.A.M.A. 186
(1958).
65. 624 P.2d at 1280. The court concluded that testimony from witnesses who have
been questioned under hypnosis concerning the subject matter of their proposed testi
mony was inadmissible in criminal trials from the moment of the hypnotic session for
ward. Id
66. Id at 1280; 292 N.W.2d at 771; see also Polk V. State, 48 Md. App. 382,427
A.2d 1041 (1981), in which the Maryland court found that the Frye test must be satisfied
before admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony. The court remanded the case to the
trial court with instructions to determine if hypnosis is a generally acceptable procedure
in the field. Id at 394, 427 A.2d at 1048.
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procured from the use of hypnosis may, under the right circum
stances, yield reasonably reliable results. 67 Accordingly, the propo
nents assert that such evidence satisfies the standards set forth in
Frye and should be admissible. 68 They argue that while disadvan
tages in using hypnosis may include distortion of memory recall be
cause of the methods that are employed, such disadvantages also
exist at nonhypnotic levels. 69
Kroger and Douce believe that hypnosis is a viable, scientific
tool and can be a new resource in the field of criminal investigation
if the hypnosis is used by trained interviewers under the direction of
qualified professionals. 70 Although Kroger and Douce conclude that
there is no simple formula for avoiding bias, the potential for bias is
greatly alleviated when the evidence produced is not anticipated by
either the subject or the hypnotist. 71
Although controversy remains, most courts that have addressed
the issue are willing to admit testimony that was the product of hyp
notic recall.72 For example, a county court in New York admitted
the testimony of a witness whose memory was refreshed by hypnosis
in People v. Hughes,73 The court did not specifically apply the Frye
test by name but took judicial notice that there was general accept
ance of hypnosis in the scientific community.74 The court concluded
that "evidence elicited through hypnosis can be valuable to the de
termination of the guilt or innocence of those who have been ac
67. See Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 3 CRIME & JUST. 61, 101
(1980). It is significant that Dr. Orne, himself a long-time critic of the use of hypnosis in
the legal process, promulgated the safeguards which were a~opted in Hurd. See supra
notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Professor Diamond, an implacable foe of investiga
tive hypnosis, had admitted that Dr. Orne and he concur on nearly all legal issues re
garding hypnosis. Diamond, supra note 37, at 338 n.l11.
68. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text for the admissibility test of new
scientific evidence.
69. Kroger and Douce,supra note 25, at 358. For an analysis of problems encoun
tered by eyewitnesses, see generally Marshall, Marquis, & Oskamp, Effects of Kind of
Question andAtmosphere 0/Interrogation on Accuracy and Completeness of Testimony, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1620 (1971); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977).
70. Kroger and Douce, supra note 25, at 358.
71. Id. at 365.
72. See supra note SO.
73. 99 Misc. 2d 863, 872-73,417 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (Onondaga County Ct. 1979).
The court in Hughes found that a rape victim's testimony while under hypnosis in which
she identified the defendant as her assailant and her subsequent recollection of the events
while in a post-hypnotic state should be admitted into evidence. Id. at 865, 872-73,417
N.Y.S.2d at 644, 649.
74. Id. at 871, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
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cused of crimes."75

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Nature of the Hurd Safeguards

Hurd assumes that recollections facilitated by hypnosis are as
reliable as normal recall when the following six procedural safe
guards are present. 76
First, the hypnosis must be carried out by a psychiatrist or psy
chologist who has special training in the use of hypnosis. 77 Second,
the hypnotist must be an independent professional who is not re
sponsible to the prosecution, since it is undesirable for the hypnotist
to be involved in the investigation of the case. 78 Thus, the hypnotist
should not do any independent investigative work that could lead
him to form an opinion about the victim, the defendant, or the event
that led to the criminal prosecution. 79 This safeguard is agreed upon
by other experts in the fields of law and hypnosis. 80
The third safeguard in Hurd requires that the individual con
ducting the hypnotic session receive factual information regarding
the case in written form only.81 The hypnotist should then review
the written material in isolation so that no one can influence him
with added information which may color his opinion. 82 As in the
second safeguard, this requirement attempts to eliminate bias which
potentially could affect the hypnotist's objectivity.83
75.

Id
See 86 N.J. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96.
77. See Orne, supra note 19, at 99. But see Frankel, The Role of Hypnotism in
Criminal Investigation, 14 HYPNOSIS Q. 14 (1980) (not requiring the hypnotist to be a
professional)..
In People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379,385 N.E.2d 848 (1979), the court admitted
the hypnotically refreshed testimony of an eyewitness to a murder. The court required
that the hypnotist be "competent." Id at 388, 385 N.E.2d at 855. This seems to be a less
stringent requirement than that set forth in Hurd. See supra note 20. What qualifies one
as "competent" or "professional" remains a source of controversy. One source defines a
"qualified" hypnotist as any law enforcement official who has completed a course by a
recognized school and who has gained expertise by attending recognized seminars or
advanced schools. Frankel, supra, at 14. This position is contrary to the Hurd require
ment that the hypnotic sessions be administered by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist
with special training in hypnosis to insure a high level of competency in all cases. See
supra note 20.
78. Orne, supra note 19, at 99.
79. Schafer & Rubio, supra note 7, at 83.
80. Id
81. Orne, supra note 19, at 99.
82. Id
83. Id
76.
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The fourth Hurd safeguard mandates that the subject be ex
amined by the hypnotist before hypnosis so that a detailed descrip
tion of the facts known to him before hypnosis may be elicited. 84
This safeguard ensures that hypnotic recollections can be compared
to recall before hypnosis. 8s Keeping a detailed record is important
because individuals often recall more about a past event when
speaking to a psychiatrist or psychologist than when talking to a
criminal investigator. 86 Thus, it may be possible for a subject to re
call important facts prior to or subsequent to the hypnotic session.
Keeping a detailed record verifies the existence of such recall.
The fifth safeguard requires that the entire contact between the
witness and hypnotist be recorded via videotape. 87 Casual com
ments that are spoken before or after hypnosis may be extremely
infiuentia1. 88 By recording the entire contact, a permanent record is
available so it can later be determined if there were suggestions
made to the subject before, during, or after the session. 89 This safe
guard is essential because the possibility of suggestibility is present
during hypnosis sessions and may be revealed by a videotape. 9o
Further, when sessions are videotaped, other experts in hypnosis are
allowed to evaluate the validity of the recall. 91 Finally, by having a
videotape, further investigation of that subject is possible as the sub
ject may remember more details after viewing the videotape.
The final safeguard adopted in Hurd is that only the witness
84. Id.
85. Id. at 99-100. Dr. Orne believes that by allowing the hypnotist to have knowl
edge of the subject's description of the experience before hypnosis is induced, the psychi
atrist or psychologist can guard against inadvertently adding new elements of the
experience during the hypnotic session. Id. at 100.
86. Id. at 99-100.
87. Id. at 99. Hurd's fifth safeguard is similar to one found in United States v.
Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978). The court there ar
ticulated mandatory requirements governing the admissibility of hypnotically induced
testimony. The court concluded that at a minimum there must be complete stenographic
records kept of hypnotized persons who later testify. The questions asked and responses
given during the hypnotic sessions were held to be essential to ensure that such evidence
was admissible. Moreover, the court suggested, but did not mandate, that an audio or
videotape be made of the interview. Id. at 199 n.12. Contra Diamond, supra note 37.
Professor Diamond found that even a videotape of everything which took place before,
during and after the sessions would not necessarily disclose all distortion occurring dur
ing the session. "Therefore, the confidence expressed by some courts in the protection
offered by stenographic, audio, or video recordings of the hypnotic session is not justi
fied." Id. at 339 (footnote omitted).
88. Orne, supra note 19, at 99.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Schafer & Rubio, supra note 7, at 83.
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and the psychiatrist should be present during any phase of the hyp
notic session. This safeguard, never mandated by any other court, is
important because it is easy for observers to inadvertently communi
cate to the subject that which is expected. 92 Dr. Orne has suggested
that if the prosecution or defendant wish to observe the hypnotic
session, a one-way screen or a television monitor may be used so that
the integrity of the session is not jeopardized.93
While not specifically enumerating it as a safeguard, Hurd also
required that no subjectivity or suggestibility94 be used during the
hypnosis. 95 For example, the use of leading questions by the hypno
tist should be prohibited so that he cannot influence responses given
by the witness. 96 Further, no posthypnotic suggestibility can be em
ployed for this would taint the entire session and render the witness
incapable of testifying. 97 This is because the subject may be vulnera
ble to suggestion immediately after coming out of the hypnotic
trance and the subject's subsequent testimony may not be reliable.
The Hurd requirements were adopted as minimal procedures
for safeguarding the hypnotic session and courts have the option· to
add more safeguards to ensure reliability.98 Providing additional in
formation at trial would help the jury to determine if the hypnoti
cally enhanced testimony of the witness was reliable. 99 Accordingly,
specific instructions should be given to the jury outlining the risks
and dangers of hypnosis; expert testimony should be admitted show
ing the reliability of hypnosis and the procedures employed; and
there should be an opportunity for the opposing party to cross-ex
amine the witness and the hypnotist. loo By employing these addi
tional safeguards, the jury would be provided with adequate means
to evaluate the credibility of the testimony. 101 These courtroom safe
guards assure that the jury is fully informed of the dangers involved
and is able to weigh the evidence accordingly.
92. Orne, supra note 19, at 100.
93. Id
94. Suggestibility occurs when something is introduced indirectly into the thought
process, for example, through hinting or intimating. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1285 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
95. 86 N.J. at 549, 432 A.2d at 98. See generally People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d
379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981).
96. See Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 395, 427 A.2d 1041, 1049 (1981).
97. See Orne, supra note 19, at 99-100.
98. 86 N.J. at 545,432 A.2d at 96.
99. Dilloff, supra note 38, at 22.
100. Id
101. Id
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B. Ram!ftcations 0/ Hurd
The safeguards adopted in Hurd offer a compromise to the in
creasingly inconsistent positions that have been taken by courts and
medical experts alike in reacting to hypnotically enhanced test i
mony.102 The New Jersey courts have now been given definitive
safeguards, the purpose of which are to ensure that the hypnotic pro
cedure is credible and reliable. 103 Ultimately, courts in other juris
dictions that have been confounded by the issue lO4 now have
concrete guidelines to use in determining the admissibility of hyp
notically enhanced evidence.
This article recommends that consistency be employed by courts
in dealing with the issue of admitting hypnotically enhanced testi
mony. Although the safeguards set forth in Hurd are burdensome
and expensive,105 they greatly minimize the risks of using hypnosis
to enhance important recall. The solution adopted by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey represents a thoughtful effort to deal with a
difficult prOblem; namely, what to do about a police technique that
helps to solve crime but has the potential to inculpate innocent
persons. 106
Hurd's safeguards should be considered by those courts that
have admitted hypnotically enhanced testimony in the past but have
not adopted specific procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina in State v. McQueen,107 for example, adlnitted the
testimony of a witness whose memory was refreshed by hypnosis but
102. Graham, Should Our Courts Reject Hypnosis? PARADE MAG., Oct. 25, 1981,
at 27. For example, the Arizona legislature is planning hearings on a bill which would
establish safeguards for the admissibility of hypnotically influenced testimony. Id Re
cently, the highest court of Maryland ordered a re-evaluation of the use of hypnosis. The
Trials of Hypnosis, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1981, at 96.
103. 86 N.J. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96; see Orne, supra note 19, at 98-99.
104. See Commonwealth v. Juvenile, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2319, 412 N.E.2d 339
(1980).
105. Graham, supra note 95, at 17.
106. Id. The author found that the same problems are presented by confessions
and police lineups, but the courts have approved such techniques under proper safe
guards. The author concludes that for many, hypnosis retains an aura of black magic.
Id
107. 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978). In McQueen, an eyewitness to the murder
of two women had trouble remembering if the defendant had committed the crimes. For
five years she remained unsure until hypnosis jogged her memory. Id at 101,244 S.E.2d
at 417.
The record, however, showed none of the procedures followed by the hypnotist nor
did it show what was related by the witness while under hypnosis. Id at 101,244 S.E.2d
at 417. Thus, it could not be determined whether there was suggestibility or subjectivity
in the hypnotic procedure. Nevertheless, the defendant's conviction for murder was up
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the court failed to realize the unique and special problems inherent
in the use of hypnosis. lOS Although the result might not have
changed, the Hurd safeguards, if strictly enforced in McQueen,
would have helped reduce suggestibility and unreliability.109
The Hurd safeguards are a particularly viable alternative for
those courts which are currently divided on whether to accept hyp
notically enhanced testimony. For example, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court recently had the opportunity to rule on the
admissibility of such testimony in Commonwealth v. Juvenile .110 The
court remanded the case because the trial court failed to make find
ings of fact on the suggestibility of the procedures employed and the
reliability of the testimony. I I I In remanding the case, the court gave
no clear indication of whether the hypnotically enhanced testimony
would be admitted if proper safeguards were employed. 112 The
court found that the ultimate issue was one of reliability I 13 and its
opinion enunciated several possible alternatives. 114 These alterna
tives ranged from a blanket exclusion as a matter of law to allowing
the testimony when certain procedures were used to enhance the reli
ability of the recall. 115 While the court took judicial notice of the
Hurd safeguards,116 it did not adopt them and, in fact, gave little
direction as to how hypnotically enhanced testimony should be dealt
with by the lower court. I 17
By employing the Hurd safeguards, the supreme judicial court
would have given lower courts in Massachusetts an operable stan
held even though the hypnotic testimony was admitted. See also State v. Greer, 609
S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981).
108. Note, Admissibility of Present Recollection Restored by Hypnosis, 15 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 357 (1979). The author criticized the lack of procedural safeguards
employed by the McQueen court and suggested that five safeguards be required. Id at
369. One of these procedural safeguards was that the jury be instructed that it should not
place undue weight upon testimony based on hypnotically enhanced memories. Id at
372.
109. See Orne, supra note 19, at 99.
110. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2319,412 N.E.2d 399 (1980).
Ill. Id at 2321, 412 N.E.2d at 341. A Boston police detective placed the victim of
an attack under hypnosis after which she was able to assist in the preparation of a com
posite picture which led to charges against the defendant. Id at 2319, 412 N.E.2d at 340.
112. Id at 2324-25, 412 N.E.2d at 343.
1l3. Id at 2324, 412 N.E.2d at 343. The court did state that consideration of the
Frye test, or a modification thereof, may be appropriate in determining reliability of
hypnotically enhanced testimony. Id
114. Id at 2325, 412 N.E.2d at 343 (citing Diamond, supra note 37).
115. Id
116. Id. at 2324 n.8, 412 N.E.2d at 343 n.8.
117. Id at 2326, 412 N.E:2d at 344.
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dard that could have been uniformly applied. It is imperative that
courts begin to promote consistency and ensure reliability in dealing
with the issue of hypnosis in the law. The Hurd safeguards create a
workable compromise l18 that have been promulgated by an es
teemed authority. I 19
IV.

CONCLUSION

The decision in State v. Hurd comes at a time when courts and
legal scholars alike are divided on the issue of the admissibility of
hypnotically enhanced testimony. The case represents a compromise
that will promote uniformity on the issue. Those courts, comprising
a majority of the jurisdictions in the United States, that have yet to
rule on the issue, are given a definitive process which may be em
ployed. A court may expand upon or ease the procedural safeguards
in Hurd depending upon the reliability that the court places upon
the hypnotically refreshed evidence in a particular case. Courts
hereafter should neither render such evidence inadmissible peT Se
nor should they admit such evidence without examining the proce
dures employed to obtain it and records maintained regarding it.
State v. Hurd is a decision that will shape the immediate future
of hypnotically enhanced testimony, although scientific research
may settle the long term controversy. Until then, the law should not
allow the trend of inconsistent results to continue since the freedom
of an innocent defendant may rest upon the court's willingness to
accept such evidence. The procedural safeguards employed in Hurd
assure consistent results on an issue that longs for consistency.
Robert E Salad

118. See The Trials of Hypnosis, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1981, at 96.
119. See, Orne, supra note 19, at 99-100.

